Dynamic Pricing and Mean Field Analysis for Controlling Age of
  Information by Wang, Xuehe & Duan, Lingjie
ar
X
iv
:2
00
4.
10
05
0v
2 
 [e
es
s.S
Y]
  2
2 A
pr
 20
20
1
Dynamic Pricing and Mean Field Analysis for
Controlling Age of Information
Xuehe Wang, Member, IEEE, and Lingjie Duan, Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract—Today many mobile users in various zones are invited to sense and send back real-time useful information (e.g., traffic
observation and sensor data) to keep the freshness of the content updates in such zones. However, due to the sampling cost in
sensing and transmission, a user may not have the incentive to contribute the real-time information to help reduce the age of
information (AoI). We propose dynamic pricing for each zone to offer age-dependent monetary returns and encourage users to sample
information at different rates over time. This dynamic pricing design problem needs to well balance the monetary payments as rewards
to users and the AoI evolution over time, and is challenging to solve especially under the incomplete information about users’ arrivals
and their private sampling costs. After formulating the problem as a nonlinear constrained dynamic program, to avoid the curse of
dimensionality, we first propose to approximate the dynamic AoI reduction as a time-average term and successfully solve the
approximate dynamic pricing in closed-form. Further, by providing the steady-state analysis for an infinite time horizon, we show that
the pricing scheme (though in closed-form) can be further simplified to an ε-optimal version without recursive computing over time.
Finally, we extend the AoI control from a single zone to many zones with heterogeneous user arrival rates and initial ages, where each
zone cares not only its own AoI dynamics but also the average AoI of all the zones in a mean field game system to provide a holistic
service. Accordingly, we propose decentralized mean field pricing for each zone to self-operate by using a mean field term to estimate
the average age dynamics of all the zones, which does not even require many zones to exchange their local data with each other.
Index Terms—Age of Information, dynamic pricing, nonlinear constrained dynamic programming, mean field game theory
✦
1 INTRODUCTION
Customers today prefer not to miss any useful information
or breaking news even if in minute, making it imperative
for a content provider to keep the posted information fresh
for profit [2], [3]. The real-time information can be traffic
condition, news, sales promotion, and air quality index,
which will become outdated and useless over time. To
keep information fresh, many content providers now invite
and pay the mobile crowd including smartphone users and
drivers to sample real-time information frequently [4]. Such
crowdsensing approach also saves a content provider’s own
cost of deploying an expensive sensor network across the
city or nation. Recently, the fast development of wireless
communication networks and sensors in portable devices
enables the mobile users to sample and send back real-time
information.
Age of information (AoI) is recently proposed as an
important performance metric to quantify the freshness of
the information. The literature focuses on the technological
issues of the AoI such as the frequency of status updates
and queueing delay analysis. In [5], the communication
time of the status update systems is considered, and it
proves the existence of an optimal packet generation rate
at a source to keep its status as timely as possible. The
Peak Age-of-Information (PAoI) metric, which is the average
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maximum age before a new update is received, is considered
in [6] for a single-class M/M/1 queueing system. [7] shows
a counter-intuitive phenomenon that zero-wait policy, i.e.,
a fresh update is submitted once the previous update is
delivered, does not always minimize the age. Considering
random packet arrivals, [8] and [9] study how to keep many
customers updated over a wireless broadcast network and
a Markov decision process (MDP) is formulated to find
dynamic scheduling algorithms. Noting the time-varying
availability of energy at the source will affect the update
packet transmission rate, [10] derives an offline solution
that minimizes both the time average age and the peak
age for an arbitrary energy replenishment. [11] considers
the users’ tradeoff between content update costs and their
messages aging, and proposes an age threshold for the users
to activate their mobile devices and update information.
However, the economic issues of controlling AoI over
different zones are largely overlooked in the literature. On
one hand, individuals incur sampling costs when sense and
send back their real-time information to content providers,
and they should be rewarded and well motivated to con-
tribute their information updates [4]. On the other hand,
recruiting a large crowdsensing pool implies a large total
sampling cost to compensate, which should be taken into
account in a content provider’s sustainable management of
its AoI ( [12], [13]). As AoI changes over time, the pricing
to reward and motivate users’ sensing efforts should be
dynamic and age-dependent to optimally balance the AoI
evolution and the sampling cost to compensate, yet this
new dynamic pricing problem is difficult to solve due to
the curse of dimensionality.
Further, we face another challenge for optimally decid-
ing the dynamic pricing in a zone: incomplete information
2about users’ private sampling costs and their random ar-
rivals at the target zone to help sample. Individuals are
different in nature and incur different sampling costs to
reflect their heterogeneity (e.g., in battery energy consump-
tion and privacy concern when sampling). A user will
accept the price offer to sample only if his sampling cost
is lower, yet the provider does not know such private cost
when deciding and announcing pricing initially. In addition,
users’ mobilities and their arrivals in different zones to sense
are random and different.
Our key novelty and main contributions are summarized
as follows.
• Dynamic pricing and mean field analysis for controlling
AoI: To our best knowledge, this paper is the first
work studying the dynamic pricing for motivating
and controlling AoI update over time, and we take
into account the users’ random arrivals and their
hidden sampling costs into account. We first look at a
single zone to control its individual AoI, by studying
how to decide the dynamic pricing to minimize its
discounted AoI and monetary payment over time.
When extending to the case of many self-operated
zones with heterogeneous user arrival rates and
initial ages, we further study how to design the
decentralized mean field pricing, where each zone
cares not only its own AoI dynamics but also the
average AoI of all the zones in a mean field game
system.
• Approximate dynamic pricing for a single zone: In the
nonlinear constrained dynamic pricing problem of
a single zone, we propose to approximate the dy-
namic AoI reduction as a time-average term and
successfully solve the approximate dynamic pricing
in closed-form. We prove that if the current AoI is
high, a high price offer should be decided to encour-
age many users to sample. Then we determine the
time-average estimator based on Brouwer’s fixed-
point theorem. We further provide the steady-state
analysis for an infinite time horizon, and show that
the pricing scheme (though in closed-form) can be
further simplified to an ε-optimal version without
recursive computing over time.
• Decentralized mean field pricing for multiple zones: For
multiple zones with heterogeneous user arrival rates
and initial ages, each zone should further take the
average AoI of all the zones into account to pro-
vide a holistic service. To reduce the complexity of
designing the dynamic pricing for many zones, we
propose a mean field term to precisely estimate the
average age among all the zones at each time slot.
We show that the resulting decentralized dynamic
pricing of each zone converges quickly, and a higher
user arrival rate results in lower price. When there
are a large number of zones, we prove that it is
not necessary for zones to exchange their local data
with each other, and the system is still ensured stable
to reach almost sure asymptotic Nash equilibrium
under our mean field pricing.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The system
model and problem formulation are given in Section 2. In
Fig. 1: Illustration of information update process in a particular zone under the
zone’s dynamic pricing and random user arrival.
Section 3, we first look at a single zone to control its AoI and
solve the approximate dynamic pricing in closed-form. Sec-
tion 4 provides the steady-state analysis of our approximate
dynamic pricing for an infinite time horizon. The extension
to many self-operated zones is studied in Sections 5 and 6,
depending on whether zones can communicate their local
data with each other or not. Section 7 concludes this paper.
1.1 Related Work
As discussed, the economic issues of controlling AoI in
target sensing zones are largely overlooked in the literature.
In the other applications of economics and game theory,
there are some related works on dynamic pricing (e.g.,
[14]–[18]). For example, in [15], dynamic WiFi pricing is
discussed under incomplete information of the user’s ser-
vice valuation and utility type. To alleviate data congestion,
time-dependent pricing is proposed in [16] for Internet
service providers to time-shift users’ data demand from
peak to off-peak periods. [17] considers the dynamic pricing
of electricity in a retail market by finding the tradeoff
between consumer surplus and retail profit. In [18], the
UAV’s dynamic service pricing is analyzed by taking into
consideration the UAV’s energy capacities for hovering and
servicing.
However, these works don’t consider the system state
evolution (e.g., the age dynamics in our problem) affected
by the dynamic pricing, not to mention the mean field game
framework for large population systems to provide decen-
tralized control. Note that prior works on mean field game
systems (e.g., [19]) and decentralized coordination systems
(e.g., [20]) do not study the dynamic pricing for controlling
the time-average state performance. In this paper, we study
the dynamic pricing for controlling the weighted sum AoI
and analytically solve the decentralized mean field pricing
for large zone population.
2 SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
We illustrate the information update process for a single
zone case in Fig. 1. The extension to multiple zones’ AoI
control in a mean field game will be presented in Sections 5
and 6. Here, we consider a discrete time horizon with time
slot t = 0, 1, · · · , T . The provider first announces price p(t)
at the beginning of time slot t, and a mobile user or sensor
may arrive randomly in this target zone in this time slot
and (if so) he further decides to sample or not by comparing
the price offer p(t) and its own sampling cost π. If the
user appears and accepts to sample (π ≤ p(t)), its sensor
data (e.g., about traffic and road condition) is transmitted
3Fig. 2: Actual age Ar(t) over time under dynamic pricing p(t).
with fixed delay A0 to reach the provider’s app for end-
customers to access.
As in the AoI literature (e.g., [8] and [9]), we consider
that the users’ random arrivals in the zone are indepen-
dent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) over time slots, by
following a Bernoulli distribution. As shown in Fig. 1, if a
user arrives in time slot t, s(t) = 1; otherwise, s(t) = 0,
where the probability of one user arrival in each time slot
is α, i.e., P(s(t) = 1) = α. Each time slot’s duration
is properly selected such that there is at most one user
arrival at a time. Further, the users’ sampling costs are
i.i.d. according to a cumulative distribution function (CDF)
F (π), π ∈ [0, b], where upperbound b is estimated from
historical data. Though all potential users’ costs follow
the same distribution, their realized costs are different in
general. Under the incomplete information, the provider
does not know the users’ arrivals for potential sampling
at time t or the arriving user’s particular cost π. It only
knows the user arrival probability α in each time slot and
the cost distribution F (π). In this paper, we consider non-
trivial user arrival rate α and small transmission delay A0.
Otherwise, the provider should always set the price p(t) to
be the upperbound b to encourage the rarely arriving users
to sample and reduce the AoI.
We adopt the Age of Information (AoI) as the perfor-
mance metric to quantify the freshness of the information
packet at end-customer side. Let Ar(t) be the instantaneous
or realized AoI at the beginning of time slot t. Considering
a linearly increasing actual age model as in Fig. 2 for the
discrete time horizon, the new age Ar(t + 1) at time t + 1
increases fromAr(t) by one, i.e.,Ar(t)+1, if the information
is not sampled by any user at time t. If a user arrives at
time t, i.e., s(t) = 1, and further accepts the price p(t),
i.e., π ≤ p(t), a new status packet will be generated and
transmitted. Then, the new age Ar(t+1) at time t+1 drops
to A0 by noting the small transmission delay A0 < 1, e.g.,
in milliseconds. Without loss of generality, we assume the
status sampling and transmission are accomplished within
a time slot.1 Then, the dynamics of the actual AoI is given
as
Ar(t+ 1) =
{
A0, if π ≤ p(t) and s(t) = 1;
Ar(t) + 1, otherwise.
(1)
Given the CDF of an arriving user’s cost F (π), the
1. This is reasonable as the information sampling plus transmission
delay (in milliseconds) is not comparable to each time slot’s duration
(in seconds or minutes), and the latter time scale is used to model a
new user’s physical arrival in the zone.
probability that a user will appear and accept the price offer
p(t) at time t is αF (p(t)). Considering uniform distribution
for the users’ private costs (i.e., F (π) = π
b
, π ∈ [0, b]), the
dynamics of the expected age A(t) is given as:
A(t+ 1) =A0αF (p(t)) + (A(t) + 1)(1− αF (p(t)))
=A(t)− (A(t)−A0)α
p(t)
b
+ (1 − α
p(t)
b
), (2)
which shows nonlinear AoI evolution due to the product of
the expected age A(t) and p(t) in the second term above.
Since the probability that a user appears and accepts
the price p(t) is αp(t)
b
, the expected payment to this user is
αp2(t)
b
. Note that the optimal price p(t) should not exceed
the maximum cost b of the user as it is unnecessary for
the provider to over-pay. The objective of the provider is to
determine the optimal dynamic pricing p(t), t ∈ {0, ..., T }
that minimizes the expected total discounted cost over time,
which is the summation of the square expected age and
expected monetary payment over time:
U(T ) = min
p(t)∈[0,b],t∈{0,...,T}
T∑
t=0
ρt(A2(t) +
αp2(t)
b
), (3)
s.t. A(t+ 1) = A(t)− (A(t)−A0)α
p(t)
b
+ (1− αp(t)
b
), (2)
where ρ ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor and indicates the
provider values the current costs than that of future. We
choose the typical square expected age A2(t) to reflect
the fact that the provider’s profit loss should be convexly
increasing in the age of its provided information.
The problem in (2)-(3) is a nonlinear constrained dy-
namic program, which is challenging to solve analytically
due to the curse of dimensionality. Imagining that a huge
number of time-dependent prices p(t) ∈ [0, b], t ∈ {0, ..., T }
must be jointly designed with the price interval τ , then
the computation complexity O(( b
τ
)T ) is formidably high
and increases exponentially in T . To analytically solve this
problem for useful insights and guidelines to the provider,
we will propose an approximation of dynamic pricing in the
following section.
3 APPROXIMATION OF DYNAMIC PRICING
To analytically obtain the optimal dynamic prices p(t), t ∈
{0, ..., T } for the nonlinear constrained dynamic problem in
(2)-(3), we approximate the nonlinear dynamics constraint
of the expected age in (2) into linear dynamics. Specifically,
we propose a time-average term δ as an estimator to ap-
proximate the possible age reduction A(t)−A0 at each time
slot t in (2), i.e.,
A(t+ 1) = A(t) − δα
p(t)
b
+ (1− α
p(t)
b
). (4)
Here, the time-average estimator δ is viewed as the time-
average age reduction of each time slot and its estimation
should also take into account the time discount factor ρ,
i.e.,2
δ =
1− ρ
1− ρT
T−1∑
t=0
ρt(A(t) −A0). (5)
In the following, given any estimator δ, we analyze the
approximate dynamic pricing in Section 3.1. Later in Section
2. There is no need to include A(T ) in δ estimation, as it will not
affect the AoI A(t) in any previous time slot t ≤ T − 1.
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(a) Approximate dynamic pricing p(t) versus
time t for high initial age A(0) = 0.5 with
T = 100 time slots.
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(b) Expected age A(t) versus time t for high
initial age A(0) = 0.5 with T = 100 time slots.
0 20 40 60 80 100
time t
0
0.5
1
1.5
o
pt
im
al
 p
ric
e 
p(t
)
(c) Approximate dynamic pricing p(t) versus
time t for low initial age A(0) = 0 with T = 100
time slots.
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(d) Expected age A(t) versus time t for low
initial age A(0) = 0 with T = 100 time slots.
Fig. 3: Dynamics of price approximate p(t) and expected age A(t) over time for high and low initial age A(0) cases, respectively.
3.2, we will further analyze how to determine the estimator
δ for finalizing pricing update. We will also show that
this approximate dynamic pricing approaches the optimal
dynamic pricing well.
3.1 Analysis of Approximate Dynamic Pricing
Though the dynamic programming problem (3)-(4) now has
only linear AoI evolution constraint in (4), it is still not easy
to solve by considering the huge number of price combina-
tions over time. We denote the cost objective function from
initial time t as
J(p, t) =
T∑
s=t
ρs−t(A2(s) +
α
b
p2(s)), (6)
and the value function given the initial age A(t) as
V (A(t), t) = min
{p(s)∈[0,b]}Ts=t
(J(p, t)|A(t)). (7)
Then, we have the dynamic programming equation at time
t:
V (A(t), t) = min
p(t)∈[0,b]
A2(t) +
α
b
p2(t) + ρV (A(t+ 1), t+ 1),
(8)
s.t. A(t+ 1) = A(t) − δαp(t)
b
+ (1− αp(t)
b
). (4)
In the following, we will analyze the optimal solution
to the dynamic problem above by using dynamic control
techniques.
Proposition 3.1. The approximate dynamic pricing p(t), t ∈
{0, ..., T } as the optimal solution to the dynamic pro-
gram (3)-(4) is monotonically increasing in A(t) and
given by3
p(t) =
ρMt+1(δ + 1) + 2ρ(δ + 1)Qt+1(A(t) + 1)
2 + 2ρQt+1
α(δ+1)2
b
, (9)
with p(T ) = 0, and the resulting expected age A(t) at
time t is
A(t) =
t∏
i=1
1
1 + ρQi
α(δ+1)2
b
A(0) +
2− ρMt
α(δ+1)2
b
2 + 2ρQt
α(δ+1)2
b
+
t−1∑
s=1
2− ρMs
α(δ+1)2
b
2 + 2ρQs
α(δ+1)2
b
t∏
i=s+1
1
1 + ρQi
α(δ+1)2
b
,
(10)
where
Qt = 1 +
ρQt+1
1 + ρQt+1
α(δ+1)2
b
, (11)
Mt =
ρ(Mt+1 + 2Qt+1)
1 + ρQt+1
α(δ+1)2
b
, (12)
with QT = 1,MT = 0 on the boundary.
3. Note that (9) automatically satisfies the constraint p(t) ∈ [0, b] as
long as the transmission delay A0 is not huge and the zone has non-
trivial user arrival rate α. In extreme case of p(t) > b for the first few
time slots (e.g., due to huge initial age A(0)), we can simply reset p(t)
to be the upperbound b and expected age A(t)will decrease and ensure
p(t) ≤ b in the long run.
5Proof Sketch: According to the first-order condition
∂V (A(t),t)
∂p(t) = 0 when solving (8) in the backward induction
process, we notice that p(t) is a linear function of A(t).
Thus, the value function in (8) should follow the following
quadratic structure with respect to A(t):
V (A(t), t) = QtA
2(t) +MtA(t) + St, (13)
yet we still need to determine Qt,Mt, St. This will be
accomplished by finding the recursion in the following.
First, we haveQT = 1,MT = 0, ST = 0 on the boundary
due to V (A(T ), T ) = A2(T ). Given V (A(t + 1), t + 1) =
Qt+1A
2(t+1)+Mt+1A(t+1)+St+1 as in (13), the dynamic
programming equation at time t is
V (A(t), t) =min
p(t)
(
A2(t) +
α
b
p2(t) + ρQt+1A
2(t+ 1)
+ ρMt+1A(t+ 1) + ρSt+1
)
.
(14)
Substitute A(t+ 1) in (4) into (14) and let ∂V (A(t),t)
∂p(t) = 0,
we obtain the optimal price p(t) in (9). Then, we substitute
p(t) in (9) into V (A(t), t) in (14), and obtain V (A(t), t) as
a function of Qt+1,Mt+1, St+1 and A(t). Finally, by refor-
mulating V (A(t), t) in (14) and noting that V (A(t), t) =
QtA
2(t) + MtA(t) + St, we obtain the recursive functions
of Qt and Mt in (11) and (12). Substitute p(t) in (9) into (4),
we obtain the expected age A(t) in (10).
Note that price p(t) depends on Qt andMt, and (though
in closed-form) still needs recursive computing over time.
According to the proof of Proposition 3.1 above, we can
see that the expected total cost U(T ) in (3) can be obtained
through the value function, i.e.,
U(T ) = V (A(0), 0) = Q0A
2(0) +M0A(0) + S0, (15)
where S0 is calculated recursively from t = T to 0 according
to
St =
4ρMt+1 − ρ2M2t+1
α(δ+1)2
b
4 + 4ρQt+1
α(δ+1)2
b
+
ρQt+1
1 + ρQt+1
α(δ+1)2
b
+ ρSt+1, (16)
with ST = 0.
Fig. 3 simulates the system dynamics over time under
the approximate dynamic price p(t) in (9). If the initial age
A(0) is high, Figs. 3(a) and 3(b) show that the dynamic
pricing p(t) is high initially to control the initial age and
then decreases as the expected age A(t) decreases until
both of them reach steady-states. This is consistent with
the monotonically increasing relationship between p(t) and
A(t) in (9). Yet when close to the end of the time horizon
T = 100, the price p(t) decreases to 0 to save immediate
sampling expense without worrying its effect to increase the
future age. Consequently, the expected age A(t) increases
again but only lasts for a few time slots. If the initial age
A(0) is low, Figs. 3(c) and 3(d) show that p(t) is low to
save sampling cost and can allow the age to increase mildly.
The price p(t) then increases with the increased age till the
steady-states for both.
3.2 Update of Estimator δ for Finalizing Pricing
Now we are ready to update the estimator δ defined in
(5) for finalizing dynamic pricing in (9). The estimator
δ is affected by all the ages A(t) over the time horizon
t ∈ {0, ..., T − 1}, which will in turn affect A(t) in (10).
Algorithm 1 Iterative computation of fixed point estimator
δ in (5)
1: Initiate ǫ′ = 1, j = 1, ǫ = 0.001, an arbitary initial
δest(0) ≥ 0, and δ = δest(0)
2: while ǫ′ > ǫ do
3: for t = 0 to T − 1 do
4: Compute Qt and Mt according to δ, (11), (12)
5: end for
6: for t = 1 to T − 1 do
7: Compute A(t) according to (10)
8: end for
9: δest(j) = 1−ρ1−ρT
∑T−1
t=0 ρ
t(A(t) −A0)
10: δ = δest(j)
11: ǫ′ = δest(j)− δest(j − 1)
12: j = j + 1
13: end while
14: return Fixed point δ
Thus we next determine δ by finding the fixed point of (5),
which will be shown to exist in our problem.
For any 1 ≤ t ≤ T − 1, we substitute δ =
1−ρ
1−ρT
∑T−1
t=0 ρ
t(A(t)−A0) in (5) into A(t) in (10), and define
A(t) = Φt(A(1), · · · , A(T − 1)), (17)
which tells A(t) is a function of all the ages {A(t), t ∈
{1, ..., T − 1}}. Then, we summarize by using the following
vector function Φ for t ∈ {1, · · · , T − 1}:
Φ(A(1), · · · , A(T − 1)) =(Φ1(A(1), · · · , A(T − 1)), · · · ,
ΦT−1(A(1), · · · , A(T − 1))).
(18)
The fixed point (if any) in Φ(A(1), ..., A(T − 1)) =
(A(1), ..., A(T − 1)) should be reached to let δ replicate
1−ρ
1−ρT
∑T−1
t=0 ρ
t(A(t)− A0) in (5) in the first place.
Note that Qt ≥ 1 in (11) andMt ≥ 0 in (12), we have the
following upperbound for (17):
Φt ≤ A(0) + t. (19)
Define continuous space Ω = [0, A(0)+1]× · · ·× [0, A(0)+
T − 1] in T − 1 dimensions. Since each Φt in (17) is con-
tinuous in Ω, the vector function Φ in (18) is a continuous
mapping from Ω to Ω. According to the Brouwer’s fixed-
point theorem, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 3.2. Φ(A(1), ..., A(T − 1)) in (18) has a fixed
point in Ω.
Given the existence of the fixed point, we are ready
to find the estimator δ in (5). Accordingly, we propose
Algorithm 1: given any initial estimator δest(j) in round
j, we can iteratively obtain the resulting expected ages
A(t), t ∈ {1, · · · , T − 1} according to (10), and then check
whether the resulting estimator δest(j + 1) in next round
converges to the last-round estimator δest(j). By repeating
the iteration process until δest(j+1) is in the neighborhood
of δest(j) with error ǫ, we obtain the fixed point δ and the
computation complexity of Algorithm 1 is O(T
ǫ
). After ob-
taining the value of δ along withQt andMt, t ∈ {0, · · · , T },
we just need to substitute them into the closed-form solution
in (9) and obtain approximate dynamic pricing.
In the following, we examine the performance of the
approximate dynamic pricing p(t) in (9) in the original AoI
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Fig. 4: Convergence of expected age A(t) in the original nonlinear AoI dynamics
system in (2) under approximate dynamic pricing p(t) in (9). The values of the
other parameters are set the same as in Fig. 3(d)
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Fig. 5: The gap between the expected total costs under the optimal pricing
(obtained via exhaustive search) and our approximate pricing (obtained in (9)
and Algorithm 1) in the original system (2)-(3) when discount factor ρ = 0.5.
dynamics system (2) without linearizing the age reduction
in (4). We wonder if the approximate pricing obtained
after linearization still ensures the expected age A(t) in
the original AoI dynamics to converge and reach a steady-
state. If so, we want to further examine the performance gap
between the expected total costs under the optimal dynamic
price (obtained via exhaustive search) and our approximate
dynamic price in the original system.
First, by applying the approximate dynamic pricing p(t)
in (9) to the original AoI dynamics in (2), Fig. 4 shows that
the expected age A(t) still converges to a steady-state only
after a few time slots, which shows that our approximate
pricing is feasible to control the AoI evolution in the original
system. This figure is for the low initial age A(0) case and it
is similar to Fig. 3(d) in the linearized AoI dynamics system
(under the same parameter setting). Thus, we can tell that
the time-average estimator δ approximates the actual age
evolution well.
Although we may imagine that the approximate dy-
namic pricing will cause performance losses (though sav-
ing computational complexity greatly), Fig. 5 shows that
the total expected cost gap between the optimal dynamic
pricing and our approximate dynamic pricing in the original
system (2)-(3) is small. We can also see that the gap increases
with the time horizon T as we need to approximate the AoI
dynamics for more time slots.
4 STEADY-STATE ANALYSIS OF DYNAMIC PRICING
We wonder how our approximate dynamic pricing and its
performance would be in the steady-state, by looking at the
infinite time horizon T → ∞ in this section. As T → ∞,
there is no ending time and we do not observe the surge of
pricing p(t) and age A(t) as in Figs. 3 and 4 when closing
to the end T . We will show that the approximate dynamic
pricing can be further simplified to an ε-optimal version
without recursive computing in (9) over time. Specifically,
the steady-state characterizations of Qt in (11) and Mt in
(12) can be found by iterating the dynamic equations until
they converge. The following lemma shows the steady-
states ofQt andMt, both of which exist and are nicely given
in closed-form.
Lemma 4.1. As T → ∞, Qt in (11) and Mt in (12) respec-
tively converge to the following steady-states:
Q =
1
2
(
1−
b(1− ρ)
ρα(δ + 1)2
+
√
(1−
b(1− ρ)
ρα(δ + 1)2
)2 +
4b
ρα(δ + 1)2
)
, (20)
M =
2ρQ
1− ρ+ ρQα(δ+1)
2
b
. (21)
Proof: Starting from the boundary condition QT =
1,MT = 0, according to Qt = 1 +
ρQt+1
1+ρQt+1
α(δ+1)2
b
in (11)
and Mt =
ρ(Mt+1+2Qt+1)
1+ρQt+1
α(δ+1)2
b
in (12), we can obtain Qt and
Mt backward given Qt+1 andMt+1 at next time slot. Based
on the starting points QT = 1,MT = 0 and ρ ∈ (0, 1), we
can check that {QT , QT−1, ..., Q0} and {MT ,MT−1, ...,M0}
are bounded increasing sequences in the reverse time order
and converge to the steady-states Q and M , respectively.
By removing the time subscripts from (11) and (12), we can
show the steady-states Q and M exist and are given in (20)
and (21), respectively.
Fig. 6 simulates the dynamics of Qt in (11) and Mt in
(12). We can see that both Qt and Mt fast converge to their
steady-states in a few rounds.
According to Q in (20) and M in (21), and note that
1
1+ρQα(δ+1)
2
b
< 1, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 4.1. For the infinite time horizon case, the
optimal pricing is simplified from (9) to
p∞(t) =
ρM(δ + 1) + 2ρ(δ + 1)Q(A(t)∞ + 1)
2 + 2ρQα(δ+1)
2
b
, (22)
and the resulting expected age A∞(t) at time t is
A∞(t) =(
1
1 + ρQα(δ+1)
2
b
)tA(0)
+
2− ρM α(δ+1)
2
b
2 + 2ρQα(δ+1)
2
b
1− ( 1
1+ρQα(δ+1)
2
b
)t
1− 1
1+ρQα(δ+1)
2
b
. (23)
As t→∞, the expected age converge to
lim
t→∞
A∞(t) =
(1 − ρ)(1 + ρQα(δ+1)
2
b
)
ρQ(δ + 1)2(α
b
(1− ρ) + ρQ(α(δ+1)
b
)2)
,
(24)
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Fig. 6: Dynamics ofQt in (11) andMt in (12) over time.
and the optimal dynamic pricing converges to
lim
t→∞
p∞(t) =
b
α(δ + 1)
. (25)
The results above still depend on δ. In the following, we
will show how to analytically find the fixed point estimator
δ of AoI reduction in the infinite time horizon. Recall that we
can only numerically compute it by Algorithm 1 in Section
3.2 for the finite time horizon.
Proposition 4.2. For the infinite time horizon, the estimator
δ can be solved as the unique positive solution to the
following equation:
ρQ
α(δ+1)2
b
(δ +A0)(1 − ρ+ ρQ
α(δ+1)2
b
)
(1− ρ)(1 + ρQα(δ+1)
2
b
)
= 1, (26)
where Q in (20) is a function of δ.
Proof: Note that δ is estimated by
1−ρ
1−ρT
∑T−1
t=0 ρ
t(A∞(t) − A0) in (5). Since A
∞(t) converges
to (24), as T →∞, we can further estimate δ as
δ =
1− ρ
1− ρT
T−1∑
t=0
ρt(A∞(∞)−A0)
=
(1− ρ)(1 + ρQα(δ+1)
2
b
)
ρQ(δ + 1)2(α
b
(1 − ρ) + ρQ(α(δ+1)
b
)2)
−A0. (27)
Then we can rewrite (27) as (26), and rewrite the left-
hand side of (26) as
v(δ) =
ρQ
α(δ+1)2
b
(δ +A0)(1 − ρ+ ρQ
α(δ+1)2
b
)
(1− ρ)(1 + ρQα(δ+1)
2
b
)
=
ρQ
α(δ+1)2
b
(δ +A0)
1− ρ
(1−
ρ
1 + ρQα(δ+1)
2
b
).
It is easy to check that Qα(δ+1)
2
b
and 1 − ρ
1+ρQα(δ+1)
2
b
above increase with δ ≥ 0. Thus, v(δ) increases with δ and
v(δ = 0)→ 0 when the delay A0 → 0. Since the right-hand
side of (26) is a constant, the positive fixed point δ is the
unique solution to (26).
4.1 ε-optimality for the Simplified Pricing in (22)
We note that the approximate dynamic pricing is further
simplified to (22) by using the steady-states Q in (20) and
M in (21) for infinite time horizon. It is unlike (9) which still
recursively updates Qt in (11) and Mt in (12) for updating
p(t) in finite horizon case. By using this simple dynamic
price p∞(t) without recursive computing over time, we
wonder its performance for a finite T horizon and denote
the resulting expected discounted cost objective as U∞(T ).
In the following proposition, we prove using Squeeze The-
orem that U∞(T ) under simplified approximate dynamic
pricing in (22) is ε-optimal compared with the expected
discounted cost U(T ) in (3) under approximate dynamic
pricing p(t) in (9).
Proposition 4.3. ∀ T > 0, there always exists an εT > 0 such
that
U(T ) ≤ U∞(T ) ≤ U(T ) + εT , (28)
and we have limT→∞ εT = 0 for a sufficiently large
horizon T .
Proof: Since Qt and Mt converge to the steady-states Q
and M respectively in the reverse time order, there exists
a time threshold t0 (t0 time slots before the end of time
horizon T ) such that for any t ≤ T − t0, Qt = Q and Mt =
M . Then, for any t ≤ T − t0, we have A(t) = A∞(t) in (23).
Moreover, according to (9) and (22), we have p(t) = p∞(t)
for any t ≤ T − t0. Therefore, the expected discounted cost
in (3) under (9) can be rewritten as
U(T ) =
T∑
t=0
ρt(A2(t) + cp2(t))
=
T−t0∑
t=0
ρt((A∞(t))2 + c(p∞(t))2)
+
T∑
t=T−t0+1
ρt(A2(t) + cp2(t))
=
T−t0∑
t=0
ρt((A∞(t))2 + c(p∞(t))2) + ε1(T ), (29)
where ε1(T ) =
∑T
t=T−t0+1
ρt(A2(t) + cp2(t)).
Note thatA(t) in (10) and p(t) in (9) are bounded. Denote
U¯ = max(A2(t) + cp2(t)|t ∈ {T − t0 + 1, · · · , T }) and U =
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Fig. 7: Performance gap U∞(T ) − U(T ) versus time horizon T under different
discounted factor ρ values.
min(A2(t)+ cp2(t)|t ∈ {T − t0+1, · · · , T }). Then, we have
ε1(T ) ≤
T∑
t=T−t0+1
ρtU¯ = U¯
ρT−t0+1(1− ρt0)
1− ρ
, (30)
and
ε1(T ) ≥
T∑
t=T−t0+1
ρtU = U
ρT−t0+1(1− ρt0)
1− ρ
. (31)
Given the fixed threshold t0 time slots before
the end of the time horizon T , according to (30)
and (31), we have limT→∞ U¯
ρT−t0+1(1−ρt0 )
1−ρ = 0 and
limT→∞ U
ρT−t0+1(1−ρt0 )
1−ρ = 0. Thus, according to Squeeze
Theorem, we have
lim
T→∞
ε1(T ) = 0. (32)
For finite horizon with steady-statesQ,M , by using (22),
we have
U∞(T ) =
T−t0∑
t=0
ρt((A∞(t))2 + c(p∞(t))2)
+
T∑
t=T−t0+1
ρt((A∞(t))2 + c(p∞(t))2)
=
T−t0∑
t=0
ρt((A∞(t))2 + c(p∞(t))2) + ε2(T ), (33)
where ε2(T ) =
∑T
t=T−t0+1
ρt((A∞(t))2 + c(p∞(t))2).
Similarly, we can show that limT→∞ ε2(T ) = 0. Since
p(t) in (9) is optimal for finite horizon, we have U(T ) ≤
U∞(T ). Combine (29) and (33), we have U∞(T ) = U(T ) +
ε2(T ) − ε1(T ), and thus for ∀ T > 0, there always exists
a εT = ε2(T ) > 0 such that U
∞(T ) ≤ U(T ) + εT with
limT→∞ εT = 0.
As shown in Fig. 7, we numerically show the difference
between U∞(T ) and U(T ) reduces as T increases, which
approaches 0 for sufficiently large T . This is consistent with
this proposition above and tells that the simple pricing
in (22) performs well once T is large (e.g., T ≥ 20 in
this numerical example and is not necessarily infinite). In
addition, Fig. 7 also shows that the convergence rate of (22)
to approach (9) decreases with the discounted factor ρ. This
is because as ρ increases, the impact of the ages and prices of
further time slots on the total cost objective U∞(T ) would
increase, which will result in greater cost gap.
5 DECENTRALIZED PRICING AND MEAN FIELD
ANALYSIS FOR MULTI-ZONE AOI SYSTEM
In this section, we extend the AoI control from a single zone
to many self-operated zones who coordinate to provide the
same type of information service (e.g., live traffic guidance)
to end-customers. In reality, there are a large number N of
zones in a city to update the information (e.g., traffic road
information), and the users arriving in each zone are invited
to sense and send back real-time information to keep the
overall information fresh. Due to the heterogeneity of the
zones (e.g., downtown or suburban areas), we practically
consider that their user arrival rates and initial AoI are
different.
5.1 Modelling of Multi-zone AoI System
More specifically, we consider N zones with heterogenous
user arrival rates αi and initial ages Ai(0), i ∈ {1, · · · , N},
and they self-operate to decide pricing incentives locally
and control their own AoI dynamics. As end-customers are
mobile and travel across various zones, each self-operated
zone not only needs to care about the AoI within its own
zone but also the other zones’ information freshness to
ensure overall service quality to end-customers [21]. For
example, Waze andWaycare share their traffic data sampled
in different zones to provide the same type of live guidance
service [22].
In this new multi-zone self-operated system, each zone i
should consider a weighted sum AoI consisting of its own
age and the average age of all the zones, i.e., wiAi(t) +
(1 − wi)
∑N
j=1 Aj(t)
N
with zone i’s weight wi ∈ [0, 1]. A
special case of this model is wi = 1 where each zone is
not cooperative at all and only cares about its own AoI.
As studied in Sections 3 and 4, then the system operation
simply degenerates to independent operation by each zone,
and our dynamic pricing schemes in Propositions 3.1 and 4.1
for each zone i can be applied. In the general model with
wi < 1 in this section, however, the average information
age across all the zones exhibits network externality and
makes the multi-zone joint pricing design over time and
zone (space) more challenging here.
Note that the weighted sum AoI of each zone i is
affected by all the other zones’ AoI and their correspond-
ing dynamic pricing. Different from (2)-(3), the objective
of each zone i ∈ N is to choose its optimal dynamic
pricing pi = {pi(t)|t ∈ {0, · · · , T }} as the best response
to p−i = {p1, . . . , pi−1, pi+1, . . . , pN} and minimize its ex-
pected discounted cost, i.e.,
U¯i(pi, p−i)
= min
pi(t),t∈{0,··· ,T}
T∑
t=0
ρt
((
wiAi(t) + (1− wi)
∑N
j=1 Aj(t)
N
)2
+
αi
b
p2i (t)
)
,
(34)
s.t. Ai(t+1) = Ai(t)− (Ai(t)−A0)αi
pi(t)
b
+(1−αi
pi(t)
b
),
(35)
9where αi, Ai(0) are different due to different user arrival
rates and initial ages in different zones. Only when wi = 1,
the multi-zone decentralized pricing problem degenerates
to the single zone problem in (2)-(3).
Similar to the analysis method in Section 3, we first
transform the nonlinear dynamics of the expected age in (35)
to linear dynamics, by introducing a time-average estimator
δi for zone i. That is, the AoI dynamics in (35) changes to
Ai(t+ 1) = Ai(t)− δiαi
pi(t)
b
+ (1− αi
pi(t)
b
), (36)
where the time-average term δi is estimated in the following
way as in (5):
δi =
1− ρ
1− ρT
T−1∑
t=0
ρt(Ai(t)−A0). (37)
Note that δi is different for different zones and is affected
by all the zones’ user arrival rates αj and age Aj(t), j ∈
{1, · · · , N}, t ∈ {0, · · · , T − 1} over time due to the multi-
zone coupling of weighted sum AoI in the objective (34).
5.2 Analysis of Decentralized Mean Field Pricing
In this section, we first propose mean-field term to approxi-
mate the average age dynamics of all the zones for the ease
of operation at individual zones, and then analyze themean-
field decentralized pricing for each zone given any mean-
field term and any zone’s time-average estimator. Later in
Section 5.3, we will further analyze how to determine the
mean field term and time-average estimators for finalizing
pricing update.
Regarding the minimization of the discounted cost func-
tion in (34), the dynamic pricing design of each zone must
take into account the average age
∑N
j=1 Aj(t)
N
of all the zones.
In practice, it is not easy for each zone to keep tracking
AoI dynamics of many other zones for adapting its own
pricing due to large communication overhead. To make the
AoI control of each self-operated zone easy to implement in
practice, we desire a decentralized dynamic pricing without
requiring all the zones to exchange information with each
other from time to time. Innovatively, we propose the fol-
lowing mean field term φ(t) which should satisfy
φ(t) =
∑N
j=1 Aj(t)
N
(38)
to estimate the average information age over time. Then
each zone i aims to design the decentralized mean field pric-
ing pi(t), t ∈ {0, · · · , T } according to φ(t) for minimizing its
estimated total discounted cost. The problem changes from
(34)-(35) to the following:
Ji(pi, φ) = min
pi(t),t∈{0,··· ,T}
T∑
t=0
ρt
((
wiAi(t) + (1− wi)φ(t)
)2
+
αi
b
p2i (t)
)
,
(39)
s.t. Ai(t+ 1) = Ai(t)− δiαi
pi(t)
b
+ (1− αi
pi(t)
b
). (36)
Given any mean-field term φ(t) in (38) and any zone
i’s time-average estimator δi in (37), we can analyze the
decentralized mean field pricing scheme for the dynamic
system in (36) and (39), by using the similar method as in
Proposition 3.1.
Proposition 5.1. In the dynamic system in (36) and (39), the
optimal decentralized mean field pricing p∗i (t) of zone i
at time t is
p∗i (t) =
ρ(δi + 1)Mi,t+1φ(t+ 1)
2 + 2ρQi,t+1
αi(δi+1)2
b
+
2ρ(δi + 1)Qi,t+1(Ai(t) + 1)
2 + 2ρQi,t+1
αi(δi+1)2
b
, (40)
with p∗i (T ) = 0, and (40) is a function of mean field term
φ(t + 1) to be estimated locally. The resulting expected
age A∗i (t) at time t is
A∗i (t) =
t∏
j=1
1
1 + ρQi,j
αi(δi+1)2
b
Ai(0)
+
2− ρMi,t(φ(t))
αi(δi+1)
2
b
2 + 2ρQi,t
αi(δi+1)2
b
+
t−1∑
s=1
(
2− ρMi,s(φ(s))
αi(δi+1)
2
b
2 + 2ρQi,s
αi(δi+1)2
b
×
t∏
j=s+1
1
1 + ρQi,j
αi(δi+1)2
b
)
, (41)
where Mi,t(φ(t)) is a function of φ(t), and
Qi,t,Mi,t(φ(t)) are obtained recursively:
Qi,t = w
2
i +
ρQi,t+1
1 + ρQi,t+1
αi(δi+1)2
b
, (42)
Mi,t(φ(t)) =2wi(1− wi)φ(t)
+
ρ(Mi,t+1(φ(t+ 1)) + 2Qi,t+1)
1 + ρQi,t+1
αi(δi+1)2
b
, (43)
with Qi,T = w
2
i ,Mi,T (φ(T )) = 2wi(1− wi)φ(T ).
We can see that, different from Proposition 3.1 for a
single zone, here p∗i (t), i ∈ {1, · · · , N} depends on the mean
field term φ(t) and the weight wi of zone i.
5.3 Update of Mean Field Term φ(t) and Time-average
Estimators δ′is for Finalizing Pricing
Given the optimal decentralized pricing in (40), we are ready
to determine the mean field term φ(t) and time-average
estimators δ′is. Note that the estimators δ
′
is, i ∈ {1, ..., N}
to estimate the dynamic age reduction of zone i and φ(t)
to estimate the average age
∑N
j=1 A
∗
j (t)
N
are affected by
{A∗i (t)|t ∈ {1, ..., T }, i ∈ {1, ..., N}} in (41) of all the zones
over time, which will in turn affect the age A∗i (t) of each
zone i at time t. Given the user arrival rates and initial ages
of all the zones, we next determine δ′is, i ∈ {1, ..., N} and
φ(t) by finding the fixed points of (37) and (38), respectively.
Proposition 5.2. The local estimator {δi, i ∈ {1, · · · , N}} in
(37) and mean field estimator {φ(t), t ∈ {1, · · · , T }} in
(38) exist and are returned by Algorithm 2.
Proof: For any zone i, substitute δi =
1−ρ
1−ρT
∑T−1
t=0 ρ
t(A∗i (t)−A0) and φ(t) =
∑N
j=1 A
∗
j (t)
N
into A∗i (t)
in (41), we can see that the age A∗i (t) of zone i at time t is a
function of the ages {A∗i (t)|t ∈ {1, ..., T }, i ∈ {1, ..., N}} of
all the zones over time. Define the following function as a
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Algorithm 2 Iterative computation of fixed point estimators
φ(t), t ∈ {1, · · · , T } in (38) and δi, i ∈ {1, . . . , N} in (37)
1: Initiate ǫ1 = 1, ǫ2 = 1, ǫ = 0.001, j = 1, arbitrary
initial φestt (0) ≥ 0, t ∈ {1, . . . , T }, δ
est
i (0) ≥ 0, i ∈
{1, . . . , N}, and φ(t) = φestt (0), t ∈ {1, . . . , T }, δi =
δesti (0), i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, user arrival rates αi and initial
ages Ai(0), i ∈ {1, . . . , N}
2: while ǫ1 > ǫ and ǫ2 > ǫ do
3: for i = 1 to N do
4: for t = 0 to T − 1 do
5: Compute Qi,t and Mi,t(φ(t)) according to (42),
(43)
6: end for
7: end for
8: for i = 1 to N do
9: for t = 1 to T do
10: Compute A∗i (t) according to (41)
11: end for
12: end for
13: for i = 1 to N do
14: δesti (j) =
1−ρ
1−ρT
∑T−1
t=0 ρ
t(A∗i (t)−A0), δi = δ
est
i (j)
15: ǫi = δ
est
i (j)− δ
est
i (j − 1), ǫ1 =
∑N
i=1 ǫi
16: end for
17: for t = 1 to T do
18: φestt (j) =
∑N
j=1 A
∗
j (t)
N
, φ(t) = φestt (j)
19: ǫ′t = φ
est
t (j)− φ
est
t (j − 1), ǫ2 =
∑T
t=1 ǫ
′
t
20: end for
21: j = j + 1
22: end while
23: return Fixed point φ(t), t ∈ {1, · · · , T } and δi, i ∈
{1, · · · , N}
mapping from {A∗i (t)|t ∈ {1, ..., T }, i ∈ {1, ..., N}} to zone
i’s age A∗i (t) in (41) at time t:
Γi,t({A
∗
i (t)|t ∈ {1, ..., T }, i ∈ {1, ..., N}}) = A
∗
i (t). (44)
To summarize any possible mapping Γi,t in (44), we can
define the following vector function as a mapping from
{A∗i (t)|t ∈ {1, ..., T }, i ∈ {1, ..., N}} to the set of all the
zones’ ages over time:
Γ({A∗i (t)|t ∈ {1, ..., T }, i ∈ {1, ..., N}})
=
(
Γ1,1({A
∗
i (t)|t ∈ {1, ..., T }, i ∈ {1, ..., N}}), . . . ,
Γ1,T ({A
∗
i (t)|t ∈ {1, ..., T }, i ∈ {1, ..., N}}), . . . ,
ΓN,1({A
∗
i (t)|t ∈ {1, ..., T }, i ∈ {1, ..., N}}), . . . ,
ΓN,T ({A
∗
i (t)|t ∈ {1, ..., T }, i ∈ {1, ..., N}})
)
. (45)
Thus, the fixed point to Γ({A∗i (t)|t ∈ {1, ..., T }, i ∈
{1, ..., N}}) = ({A∗i (t)|t ∈ {1, ..., T }, i ∈ {1, ..., N}})
in (45) should be reached to let δi and φ(t) replicate
1−ρ
1−ρT
∑T−1
t=0 ρ
t(A∗i (t)−A0) and
∑N
j=1 A
∗
j (t)
N
, respectively.
We can check that Γi,t ≤ Ai(0) + t. Define set Ω′ =
[0, A1(0)+1]×· · ·×[0, A1(0)+T ]×· · ·×[0, AN(0)+1]×· · ·×
[0, AN (0) + T ]. Since Γi,t is continuous, Γ is a continuous
mapping from Ω′ to Ω′. According to the Brouwer’s fixed-
point theorem, Γ has a fixed point in Ω′.
Let us explain the procedure of Algorithm 2 in the
following. Given any initial estimators δesti (j) and φ
est
t (j)
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Fig. 8: Impact of user arrival rate on the decentralized mean field pricing p∗i (t)
in (40) under original AoI dynamics (35). Here we consider N = 6 zones with
randomly selected user arrival rates α′is.
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Fig. 9: Convergence of agesAi(t) forN = 20 heterogeneous zones with different
user arrival rates α′is, initial ages Ai(0)
′s and weight w′is, i ∈ {1, · · · , N}
under original AoI dynamics (35) and decentralized mean field pricing p∗i (t) in
(40).
in round j, we iteratively obtain the resulting expected
ages A∗i (t) for each zone i according to (41). By repeat-
ing the iteration process until δesti (j + 1) → δ
est
i (j) and
φestt (j + 1) → φ
est
t (j) within arbitrarily small error ǫ, the
computation complexity of Algorithm 2 is O(TN
ǫ
). Different
from Algorithm 1 for searching only in the time domain,
here Algorithm 2 jointly searches through both time and
zone domains.
In the simulations, by applying the decentralized mean
field pricing p∗i (t) in (40) to the original nonlinear system
(35), we first consider N = 6 zones with identical initial
age Ai(0) = 0 and weight wi = 0.7, and choose varying
user arrival rate αi to show the impact of user arrival rates
on the mean field pricing. As shown in Fig. 8, the mean
field pricing p∗i (t) of each zone i converges to a steady-state
fast (within 10 time slots), and a higher user arrival rate αi
motivates this zone to set a lower mean field pricing p∗i (t)
as compared to the other zones. This is because the zone
can patiently wait for a target user with low sampling cost
if there are more user arrivals to sample. When close to the
end of the time horizon T = 100, the price pi(t) decreases
to 0 to save immediate sampling expense without worrying
the future age.
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In another simulation, we examine the convergence
of the expected age Ai(t) by applying p
∗
i (t) in (40) to
the original nonlinear AoI dynamics (35). As shown in
Fig. 9, for N = 20 heterogeneous zones with different
user arrival rates α′is, initial ages Ai(0)
′s and weight w′is,
i ∈ {1, · · · , N}, the expected age Ai(t) of each zone i
converges to a steady-state quickly. When close to the end of
the time horizon T = 100, the expected age Ai(t) increases
again due to decreasing pi(t) to the end. We also check that
initial age Ai(0) does not change the steady-state pricing.
6 DECENTRALIZED PRICING FOR LARGE ZONE
POPULATION WITHOUT LOCAL DATA EXCHANGE
Our decentralized pricing solution in (40) and mean field
term estimation in Algorithm 2 require each zone i to know
any other zone j’s local data, i.e., initial age Aj(0) and user
arrival rate αj . Such local data are not constant all the time
but change over different time periods (e.g., from off-peak
to peak hours). Even each zone manages to collect such
data over time, yet such local data sharing among a large
number of zones (in a metropolis) introduces a large of
communication overhead. In this section, we want to extend
the decentralized solution developed in last section to a
more challenging large-population case without even asking
many zones to exchange their local data with each other.
6.1 Mean Field Term Estimation using Large Popula-
tion Limit
We propose to employ the large population limit to de-
termine the joint empirical distribution of the arrival rates
and initial ages, and then predict the mean field term φ(t)
accordingly. To be specific, when the zone population N is
sufficiently large and exhibits certain statistical properties,
the arrival rate αi and initial age Ai(0) of any individual
zone i, i ∈ {1, . . . , N} no longer play important roles.
We care about the occurrence frequency of any possible
αi value and any Ai(0) value in the respective feasible
sets A and R+ to determine the age evolution as well
as the mean field term φ(t). Define the joint empirical
CDF FN (α,Aini) of the N zones for the two dimensional
sequences {(αi, Ai(0)), i ∈ {1, · · · , N}} with feasible sets
αi ∈ A and Ai(0) ∈ R+ as:
FN (α,Aini) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
1(αi≤α,Ai(0)≤Aini), (46)
where Aα,Aini(t) is the age of a typical zone at time t with
arrival rate α and initial age Aini. Then, according to the
joint empirical CDF FN (α,Aini), we have∑N
j=1 Aj(t)
N
=
∫
A
∫
R+
Aα,Aini(t)dFN (α,Aini). (47)
Suppose there exits a continuous CDF Fα,Aini(α,Aini)
with α ∈ A, Aini ∈ R+ such that limN→∞ FN (α,Aini) =
Fα,Aini(α,Aini). Since we want the mean field term φ(t) to
replicate
∑N
j=1 A
∗
j (t)
N
and we only know the joint cumulative
distribution Fα,Aini(α,Aini) instead of realized α
′
js and
Aj(0)
′s, we employ the large population limit to estimate
φ(t), i.e.,
φ(t) =
∫
A
∫
R+
A∗α,Aini(t)dFα,Aini(α,Aini). (48)
Then, for any given mean field estimator φ(t) in (48), we
can obtain the decentralized dynamic pricing p∗i (t) in (40)
and expected age A∗i (t) in (41) as in Proposition 5.1. Given
the joint cumulative distribution Fα,Aini(α,Aini), we can
also determine the fixed point mean field estimator φ(t), t ∈
{1, · · · , T } according to Algorithm 2, by replacing φestt (j)
in Line 18 of Algorithm 2 with
φestt (j) =
∫
A
∫
R+
A∗α,Aini(t)dFα,Aini(α,Aini). (49)
Here, we should note that in Algorithm 2, Qα,t and
Mα,t(φ(t)) calculated according to (42) and (43) are func-
tions of α, and thus the resulting ageA∗α,Aini(t) is a function
of α and Aini.
In the following proposition, we show that the mean
field term φ(t) introduced in (48) is a perfect estimator of
the average age
∑N
j=1 A
∗
j (t)
N
, as long as the zone population
N is sufficiently large.
Proposition 6.1. Using the optimal price p∗i (t) in (40) with
new φ(t) in (48), for any t ≥ 0,
lim
N→∞
|φ(t)−
∑N
j=1 A
∗
j (t)
N
| = 0. (50)
Proof: In the following proof, we first consider the
one dimensional case by fixing the initial ages Ai(0), i ∈
{1, · · · , N} of all the zones to be the same. Then, the mean
field term φ(t) in (48) can be simplified as
φ(t) =
∫
A
A∗α(t)dF (α), (51)
where A∗α(t) is the expected age of the zone at time t with
user arrival rate α.
According to (47) and (51), we have
|φ(t)−
∑N
j=1 A
∗
j (t)
N
| = |
∫
A
A∗α(t)dF (α)−
∫
A
A∗α(t)dFN (α)|.
(52)
Then, we extend the domain of A∗α(t) from A to R in
order to use Helly-Bray Theorem. AssumeA = [a, a]. Define
A′α(t) =


A∗α(t), for α ∈ A;
A∗a(t), for α > a;
A∗a(t), for α < a.
(53)
Thus, we have extended function A∗α(t), α ∈ A to
A′α(t), α ∈ R with
∫
AA
∗
α(t)dF (α) =
∫
R
A′α(t)dF (α) and∫
A A
∗
α(t)dFN (α) =
∫
R
A′α(t)dFN (α). Since Qα,t > 0 in (42)
and Mα,t(φ(t)) > 0 in (43) are continuous in α, and the de-
nominators ofA∗α(t) in (41) are positive,A
∗
α(t) is continuous
in α ∈ A. Note thatA∗α(t) ≤ Aα(0)+t is bounded, according
to Helly-Bray Theorem, if FN (α) converges weakly to F (α),
lim
N→∞
∫
R
A′α(t)dFN (α) =
∫
R
A′α(t)dF (α). (54)
Thus,
lim
N→∞
|
∫
A
A∗α(t)dF (α) −
∫
A
A∗α(t)dFN (α)|
= lim
N→∞
|
∫
R
A′α(t)dF (α) −
∫
R
A′α(t)dFN (α)| = 0.
(55)
We can extend this result similarly in the two dimension
case with both heterogeneous initial ages and user arrival
rates.
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6.2 Almost Sure Asymptotic Nash Equilibrium
In the following, we will analyze the performance of
the decentralized mean field pricing p∗i (t) in (40), which
is designed based on the mean field estimator φ(t) =∫
A
∫
R+
A∗α,Aini(t)dFα,A(α,Aini) without requiring each
zone to know the other zones’ initial ages and user arrival
rates. Note that such lack of information may disrupt the
decentralized mean field pricing and hinder the multi-zone
self-operated system to converge to a stable state. Thus, our
main concern here is whether the decentralized mean field
pricing scheme in (40) (with φ(t) in (48) locally estimated
by each zone) ensures system stability to reach almost sure
asymptotic Nash equilibrium.
Definition 6.1. A set of dynamic pricing {p∗i , i ∈
{1, · · · , N}} with p∗i = {p
∗
i (t)|t ∈ {0, · · · , T }} is
called an almost sure asymptotic Nash equilibrium with
respect to the total expected cost objective {U¯i, i ∈
{1, · · · , N}} in (34), if there exists a sequence of non-
negative variables {εN , N ≥ 1} such that for any
i ∈ {1, · · · , N},
U¯i(p
∗
i , p
∗
−i) ≤ inf
pi
U¯i(pi, p
∗
−i) + εN , (56)
where limN→∞ εN = 0.
We next prove that the system stability is ensured by our
decentralized mean field pricing p∗i (t) in (40) and φ(t) in
(48).
Proposition 6.2. The decentralized mean field pricing
{p∗i , i ∈ {1, . . . , N}} in (40) generated through the mean
field estimator φ(t) in (48) forms an almost sure asymp-
totic Nash equilibrium for reaching the system stability,
i.e., for any i ∈ {1, · · · , N},
U¯i(p
∗
i , p
∗
−i) ≤ inf
pi
U¯i(pi, p
∗
−i) + εN , (57)
where
εN =
√√√√ T∑
t=0
ρt(φ(t)−
∑N
j=1 A
∗
j (t)
N
)2, (58)
with limN→∞ εN = 0.
Proof: For any i ∈ {1, · · · , N}, we have
U¯i(p
∗
i , p
∗
−i)
=
T∑
t=0
ρt
((
wiAi(t) + (1− wi)φ(t)
)2
+
αi
b
(p∗i (t))
2
)
+
T∑
t=0
ρt(1− wi)
2(φ(t)−
∑N
j=1 A
∗
j (t)
N
)2
+ 2
T∑
t=0
ρt
((
wi(1− wi)A
∗
i (t) + (1− wi)
2φ(t)
)
× (φ(t) −
∑N
j=1 A
∗
j (t)
N
)
)
=Ji(p
∗
i , φ) + (1− wi)
2(εN )
2 + χN .
(59)
By the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, we have
χN ≤2
√√√√( T∑
t=0
ρt
(
wi(1− wi)A∗i (t) + (1− wi)
2φ(t)
)2)
×
√√√√( T∑
t=0
ρt(φ(t)−
∑N
j=1 A
∗
j (t)
N
)2
)
=2εN
√√√√( T∑
t=0
ρt
(
wi(1− wi)A∗i (t) + (1− wi)
2φ(t)
)2)
.
(60)
Since φ(t) is bounded due to bounded Ai(t), i ∈
{1, · · · , N}, χN = O(εN ) and thus (εN )2 + χN = O(εN ).
Note that p∗i is the optimal solution with respect to the
estimated discounted cost function Ji(pi, φ) in (39), i.e., p
∗
i =
arg infpi Ji(pi, φ). Then, similar to the above analysis, we
have
Ji(p
∗
i , φ) = inf
pi
Ji(pi, φ) ≤ inf
pi
U¯i(pi, p
∗
−i) +O(εN ). (61)
Therefore, according to (59) and (61), we obtain (57).
Further,
εN =
√√√√ T∑
t=0
ρt(φ(t) −
∑N
j=1A
∗
j (t)
N
)2
,
√√√√ T∑
t=0
ρt(µN (t))2 < sup
t
µN (t)
√
1− ρT+1
1− ρ
.
(62)
Based on Proposition 6.1, for any t > 0,
limN→∞ µN (t) = 0. Therefore, we have limN→∞ εN = 0.
7 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have studied the AoI control by using
dynamic pricing to well balance the AoI evolution and
monetary payments over time. We have formulated this
problem as a nonlinear constrained dynamic program under
the incomplete information about users’ random arrivals
and their private sampling costs. To avoid the curse of
dimensionality, we first propose a weighted time-average
term to estimate the dynamic AoI reduction, and success-
fully solve the approximate dynamic pricing in closed-form.
We further provide the steady-state analysis for an infinite
time horizon, and show that the pricing scheme (though
in closed-form) can be further simplified to an ε-optimal
version without recursive computing over time. Finally, we
extend the AoI control from a single zone to many zones
with heterogeneous user arrival rates and initial ages, where
each zone cares not only its own AoI dynamics but also the
average AoI of all the zones to provide a holistic service.
Accordingly, we design decentralized mean field pricing for
each zone to self-operate by using a mean field term to
estimate the average age dynamics of all the zones, which
does not even require many zones to exchange their local
data with each other.
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